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Entrenched Managers & Corporate Social

Responsibility
Shane M. Shelley*
A growing number of academics have suggested U.S. corporate
governance laws bestow too much power on managers. Much of the
research focuses on the relationship between corporate governance
arrangements, which supply a means to managerial power, and the
financialperformance of corporations. This exclusive focus on financial
performance may be misguided. Although profits serve as a proxy for
the benefits corporationsprovide society, they do not always adequately
reflect the costs of the activities that generated them. In this sense,
financial performance may not give an accurate, or at least complete,
picture of the real value of corporations. Whether managers are too
entrenched by the laws of corporate governance, therefore, depends not
only on their profitability but also on how they spend their discretion.
Importantly, entrenched managers could use their discretion to sacrifice
profits in the public interest. Building on prior research, this Article
compares six entrenchinggovernance provisions with the appearanceof
corporationson two investment indexes based on "socialresponsibility,"
a measurement of performance along environmental, social and
alternative economic factors. The results confirm a socialpsychological
hypothesis of the Article: entrenchment-asmeasured by the presence of
these six provisions-was negatively, and significantly, related to
inclusion in the indexes. Although I offer competing explanations in
addition to the hypothesis, the results tentatively support the conclusion
that certain corporategovernance arrangementsentrench managers too
much, leading to both poorfinancialand "social"performance.
Introduction
Self-interest governs the all-too-human managers of our public
* Briefing Attorney, Supreme Court of Texas; B.A., Stanford University; M.A.
(Sociology), Stanford University; J.D., Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Noah

Clements, Einer Elhauge, Jon Hanson and Robert Steiner for their helpful comments, and
especially Micah May for his contribution to the statistical analysis.
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corporations. We should be wary of corporate laws that insulate them
from accountability to shareholders and the external markets for
corporate control. Without the discipline of accountability, executives
pursue personal agendas adverse to the interests of the corporation and,
in the end, society as a whole. 1 For corporate wealth means social
wealth,2 each of which is harmed by the accumulation of excessive
incomes and self-aggrandizing empires, the theft of business
opportunities, shirking of responsibilities and just plain lame
performance. 3 Such becomes the aggravated case when managers are
left with more discretion than necessary, entrenched against the
discipline of accountability to the interests of others.
Research, in fact, demonstrates a negative relationship between
corporate governance arrangements that entrench managers and financial
value. Staggered boards of directors, for example, which "stagger" the
election of directors and make their wholesale replacement nearly
impossible, have been associated with decadent financial performance.4
Limits on the rights of shareholders to amend corporate charters and
bylaws, "poison pills" that preclude straightforward takeovers and
"golden parachutes" that guarantee a profitable landing for departing
executives show similar negative relationships.5
Each of these
arrangements entrench managers and have been statistically related to
lower financial value for the corporations burdened with such provisions.
Use of these provisions, the research argues, should be curtailed.
But an exclusive focus on financial performance could be
misguided. Self-interest comes in many forms. Managers, like people in
general, respond to social and moral norms as well as financial

1. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72, 88-89 (2003); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of
American CorporateFinance,91 COLO. L. REV. 10, 12 (1991). See generally Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm. ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).

2. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970 (arguing corporations, which
best allocate scarce resources in a free market, should focus on profits and not undermine
the democratic mechanisms and spirit of our society).
3. See David I. Walker, The Manager'sShare, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 591598 (2005); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 72, 88-89.
4. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J.
FIN. ECON. 409 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates, IV & Guhan Subramanian,
The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54
STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).
5. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in
CorporateGovernance? (John M. Olin Ctr. For Law, Econ., and Bus., Harvard Law Sch.,
Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004). Practitioners note golden parachutes also incentivize
managers to sell their corporations; thus, such provisions certainly allocate power to
managers, but their effects on beneficial takeovers are more uncertain.
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incentives. Further, even with such an expanded understanding of selfinterest, humans continue to confound the experts. In short, research also
demonstrates much cannot be explained in terms of the more rational and
avaricious motivations assumed above.6 And we should be thankful.
Managers, at least, have some sense of human decency; corporationsthe infamous sociopaths--do not.7 For this reason, among others,
corporate wealth does not always mean social wealth. Thus, some
discretion from accountability to shareholders and takeovers, and
therefore some discretion from the cold maximization of profits, allows
managers the freedom to act on social and moral obligations that could
mitigate the otherwise unregulated costs of some corporate activities. 9 In
some cases, managers could be spending their discretion on the sacrifice
of profits for the public, rather than the private, good. Financial
performance, therefore, does not give us a complete picture of the social
value of entrenchment and, accordingly, the wisdom of legally allowing
the aforementioned governance arrangements.
Each of these perspectives likely bears some resemblance to the
truth. Managers, like most everyone else, respond to selfish impulses,
social norms, moral beliefs and inherent concern for other humans.
Although conventional wisdom asserts selfish impulses run the best race,
social psychological theory does not support such simplicity. Rather,
context plays as much a role as anything in determining not only which
motivations come to the fore, but also how these motivations are played
out. For example, games-a type of context-bring competitive natures
to the foreground. The rules of the games, whether they involve the
accumulation of wealth or the scoring of goals, affect how the
competition unfolds. Importantly, neither the games nor the rules are a
priori necessary. For this reason, whether entrenched managers use their
6.

See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing CorporateProfits in the Public Interest, 80

N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 752-54 (2005).
7. See generally JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF

PROFIT AND POWER (Free Press 2004) (arguing a psychological evaluation of the fictitious
corporate "person" would reveal a sociopath).
8. Corporations, for example, require regulation for the purpose of managing
negative externalities: those costs of corporate activities not reflected in corporate profits.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 98 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser
eds., 1991) (1985) ("[T]here is no theoretical doubt about the propriety of legal
intervention that requires firms to take account of the effects of their acts on third
parties.").
9. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 119-20
(Basic Books, Inc. 1988) (1911) (observing interest groups tend to corrupt government
regulation); Elhauge, supra note 6, at 747-49, 751-56 (arguing social and moral norms
supplement government regulation, which is inherently imperfect because of under- and
over-inclusion problems, interest group influences, and the imperfect aggregation of
preferences).
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discretion for personal glory or public interest could depend, at least in
part, on the contexts in which managers find themselves. Corporate
governance arrangements are, of course, part of the context.
Context could produce some surprising results. Apart from a
natural skepticism about the probability that entrenched managers would
use their discretion for the public interest, I was interested in the
possibility that managers accountable to shareholders and takeover
markets might be accountable to broader social concerns because their
context accentuates general accountability as a rule of thumb.
Accordingly, I predicted entrenched managers, who are less accountable
to profits, would also lead less socially responsible corporations.
Building on the research negatively associating financial value with
entrenchment, I compared the entrenchment provisions of those studies
with inclusion in two established investment indexes of socially
responsible corporations.
As predicted, entrenchment was also
negatively associated with inclusion in these indexes, further supporting
the position that governance provisions, such as staggered boards,
deserve careful scrutiny not only for their detraction from financial
value, but also their potential implication for broader measures of social
value.
Part I reviews the research suggesting a negative relationship
between entrenching governance arrangements and financial value. Part
II presents the results of my empirical study, suggesting a negative
relationship between these provisions and social responsibility.
Numerous explanations could be offered for the results. Part III reviews
a sample, including the social-psychological theory that led to the study.
Normative claims about entrenchment prove difficult.
Plausible
interpretations, for example, include the possibility that profitable
corporations and managers merely "game" social responsibility indexes.
Much of Part III, however, paints a rosier picture. Coupled with existing
research on financial performance, the results of this study tentatively
buttress claims that corporate governance laws allow too much insulation
from accountability.
Nevertheless, the Article concludes with a
discussion of problems that inhere in any practical changes to the laws of
corporate governance.
Entrenchment may present a dilemma for
financial and social value, but we should take care that any remedies do
not cause more harm than good. In this way, areas for further research
are also discussed.
In the background, this Article has two additional objectives
unrelated to definitive normative conclusions. First, this Article hopes to
address, through example, the significant lack of empirical research
concerning measurements of value other than financial performance
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within corporate governance law and general business literature.10
Second, this Article explores the use of "critical realism""1 in conjunction
with "law and economics" approaches. Among other things, such
realism can inform law and economic models based on narrow
conceptions of the human animal and its "self-interest." Each approach
influences what follows, but we should understand that the former, more
psychologically oriented, framework predicted the empirical results
herein. In these respects, the Article hopes to serve as an example of
how empirical research surrounding corporate law could be expanded
and enriched through an amalgam of economics and psychology.
I.

Entrenched Managers Create Less Financial Value

Shareholders of a corporation could respond to management
shortcomings in several ways. Shareholders could publicly speak out,
demand redress of grievances through shareholder proposals, 12 sell their
stock and leave, 13 or oust the managers and start anew. Complete and
effective response would likely require some combination of these
forms. 14

However, good old-fashioned oustings of executives appear

most favored. 15

Delaware, the grand dame of corporate law, has

10. See Margolis, Walsh & Weber, Social Issues and Management: Our Lost Cause
Found, 29 J. MGMT. 859 (2003) (concluding scholarship has increasingly focused on
financial performance and paid little attention to other effects on society after reviewing
research published from 1958 to 2001).
11. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character,Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
129, 181-84 (2003).
12. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006).
13. See generally Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial
Markets: the Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 Bus.
LAW. 681 (2002) (observing the rise of this option but discussing its inefficacy).
14. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (Harvard University Press 1970).

With regard to corporations, Hirschman focuses on the response of consumers; his
general theory applies to shareholders as well. Hirschman sorts responses into two broad
types, "voice" and "exit," which roughly refer to voicing opinions and leaving altogether.
Each have limitations, necessitating a complex interplay of both for effective feedback.
Shareholders, for example, may generally like their corporation and its management;
responding, then, with an "exit" to dissatisfaction with a particular aspect of the business
would be inappropriate. Under different circumstances, responding with "voice" to
systemic dissatisfaction could prove futile and a waste of resources. Matters become
much more complicated with the incorporation of timing into considerations of optimal
responses. "Exit" options, for example, may occur too late; by the time a shareholder
sells his ownership or ousts management, the damage may have already occurred beyond
repair.
15. Even with the rise of institutional investors, shareholders lack the interest,
resources, expertise and incentives to adequately monitor corporate decisions at the level
of shareholder proposals. Furthermore, there are reasons to believe exit strategies of
selling shares and boycotting corporations also have serious limitations. This leaves
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recognized the "shareholder franchise" as the "ideological underpinning
upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests."' 16 As the Delaware
Supreme Court observed, "If the stockholders are displeased with the
action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate
democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out."' 7
Laws of corporate governance, on the other hand, provide numerous
means with which the managers of public corporations can protect
themselves from shareholder meddling.' 8 With regard to that oldfashioned ousting, executive salvation often comes from limitations on
the rights of shareholders and defenses against outside takeovers adopted
by boards of directors.' 9 These governance provisions entrench
managers in their jobs, insulating them, to some extent, from
accountability to shareholders and takeover markets.20 For some, these
provisions render the promise of the "shareholder franchise" a "myth." 2'
Nevertheless, debate ranges as to the effects of entrenchment on the
financial value of corporations. Although entrenchment provides the
means to pursue harmful personal agendas,2 2 entrenchment also allows
ousting as the most effective and appropriate response to perceived poor performance.
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 514-15
(Foundation Press 2002) (observing scholarship that notes shareholders lack the interest,
resources, expertise and incentives to monitor the details of corporate management);
Knoll, supra note 13, at 683-84, 710-13 (observing theoretical limitations of responding
to dissatisfaction through selling shares); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453-64 (1991)
(observing collective action problems of shareholders). But cf id. at 447, 452 (discussing
rising role of institutional shareholders, opportunity for amelioration of collective action
problems, but new level of agency problems); Knoll, supra note 13, at 685-86 (noting
political efficacy of divestment campaigns in South African corporations during
apartheid). Additionally, SEC regulations constrict shareholder proposals significantly.
See 17 C.F.R. 240 § 14a-8(i) (2006). Further, such resolutions are precatory and
regularly ignored by management. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
ShareholderPower, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 876-77 (2005).
16. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
17. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
18. Apart from corporate governance arrangements, prominent legal doctrines, such
as the "business judgment rule," protect managers as well. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971); REv. MOD. Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.3 1(a)(2) (1984).
19. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 2-3.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus.
LAW. 43, 45 (2003).

22. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 5-6 (reviewing literature); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Symposium: Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation:
Corporate Control Transactions: The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161
(1981) (concern over effects on takeovers); Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (noting weakened discipline could lead
to shirking, empire-building and extraction of private benefits by incumbents).
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for long-term strategies, cohesive boards of directors and reduced waste
in the defense of takeovers.23
Entrenched managers appear to be using their discretion more for
personal agendas than corporate wealth. Empirical evidence supports the
proposition that greater entrenchment, under the present balance of
power within the corporate form, leads to decreased financial
performance.2 4 For example, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell
argue four constitutional governance provisions and two takeover
defenses particularly entrench managers from shareholder and takeover
accountability and, in the end, are strongly associated with lower
financial value.25 In short, there may be six particularly potent
governance provisions executives can use to protect their jobs.
Staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of the corporate
bylaws, super-majority voting requirements for mergers and other
acquisition transactions, and super-majority voting requirements for
charter amendments compose the constitutional provisions;
poison pills
26
and golden parachutes compose the takeover defenses.
Statistical. data demonstrated a significant, negative relationship
between the level of entrenchment, as measured by the aggregated
presence of these six provisions, and the financial value of corporations,
as measured by Tobin's Q, an increasingly standard economic
indicator. 27 Bebchuk et al. also observed a significant, negative
23. See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Precommitment and ManagerialIncentives:
Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577
(2003) (reduces need to pursue other, more inefficient anti-takeover strategies that are
unregulated); Bebchuk, supra note 21, at 43 (citing numerous SEC comment letters
arguing against increased shareholder access to board elections); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Lars Stole, Do Short-Term ManagerialObjectives Lead to Under- or Over-Investment in
Long-Term Projects? 48 J. FtN. 719, 719-29 (1993) (allows for long-term investment);
Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests In the Company's Proxy: An
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAW. 67 (2003) (noting, among other things,
management discretion prevents special interest directors, balkanized boards and
expensive proxy contests); Jeremy Stein, Takeover Threats and ManagerialMyopia, 96
J. POL. ECON. 61, 61-80 (1988) (allows for long-term investment); Lynn A. Stout, Do
Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation
Problem, 55 STAN. L. REv. 845 (2002) (ex ante analysis suggests anti-takeover provisions
encourage non-shareholder groups to make extra-contractual investments in corporate
team production); Rene M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing
Policies and the Market for Corporate Control, 1988 J. FIN. EcON., 20, 25-54 (allows
incumbents to extract higher control premium for shareholders).
24. See Bebchuk, supra note 15, at 852-53, 898-901; Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at
11-12; Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 4.
25. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.
26. Id. at 6-9.
27, Id. at 16. They use the following measurement of "Q": market value of assets
divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the
book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of book value
of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes. Id. at 17. They also present
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relationship between financial performance and each provision
separately.28 Underlying these results lurks the hypothesis that selfinterested managers-agents of the shareholders of the corporationshockingly divert corporate resources from the pockets of investors to
other ends. With more entrenchment comes more diversion. 29
Theory supports these results. Each of these provisions was
expected to produce significant insulation from accountability to
shareholders and external takeovers.30
With such increased
entrenchment, incentives to maximize profits relax, the interests of
managers diverge from shareholders and the corporation suffers.3 1
Empirically, the data suggests these costs outweigh any theoretical
benefits from increased managerial insulation. A brief description of the
provisions and their entrenching nature follows.
Having a staggered board means the directors of the board are
divided into classes with only one class of directors coming up for
reelection each year.32 Consequently, shareholders cannot replace a
majority of the directors in any given year regardless of support for such
change.33 Staggered boards are a powerful defense against removal in
either a proxy fight or proxy contests.34 Independent empirical evidence
has observed negative relationships between the presence of staggered
boards and susceptibility to takeover3 5 as well as firm value.36
Boards also may limit the ability of shareholders to amend the
bylaws.37 These limits, contained either in corporate charters or the
bylaws themselves, usually take the form of super-majority voting
requirements.3 8 In addition, corporations may limit the ability of
empirical data demonstrating a negative correlation between entrenchment and abnormal
shareholder returns throughout the 1990s. Id. at 22-33.

28. Id. at 20.
29. Id. at 18-19.
30.

Id. at 6-7.
Bebchuk, supra note 21, at 44 (shareholder power provides directors incentives
to serve shareholder interests); Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 72 (managers can use
discretion for empire building, retaining excess corporate cash and entrench themselves
despite poor performance); id. at 88-89 (rent extraction, besides increasing executive pay,
dilutes and distorts management incentives and harms corporate performance); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 262
(Harvard University Press 1991) (presuming managers with power will "wring" as much
from shareholders as possible); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 701 (1982) (financial incentives ameliorate
agency costs due to diverging interests of managers and shareholders).
32. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 14 1(d) (2006).
33. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 6-7.
34. Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 4.
35. Id.
36. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 4.
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 109 (2006).
38. Such limits can make shareholder amendments to the bylaws virtually

31.
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shareholders to amend the charter and limit their ability to approve
mergers and other acquisition transactions.39 Again, such limitations
usually take the form of super-majority voting requirements. 40 Given the
nature of shareholder ownership in large public corporations, such supermajority requirements greatly impede not only the ability of shareholders
to affect change but also the success of shareholder-favored takeovers. 4 '
Poison pills, a takeover defense, preclude straight-forward hostile
takeovers that would have simply accumulated stock for the purpose of
attaining ownership control.4 2 Such "pills," which "poison" the stock,
usually render further acquisition of shares prohibitively expensive after
a threshold of ownership.4 3 Golden parachutes,another defense, provide
departing executives cushy severance packages and thereby increase the
cost of takeovers accompanied by the replacement of management. 44 Of
course, a corporate board can create these two provisions at any time;
thus, even corporations that do not have these provisions could be seen
as having their shadowy versions.4 5 At the same time, not all
corporations do have them in place and shareholders have demonstrated
an increasing distrust of their presence; in the end, the presence of these
provisions may not reflect entrenchment itself but the attitude of
corporate managers toward the practice. 46
Although other corporate governance arrangements could contribute
to entrenchment as well, there are theoretical reasons to doubt the
significance of such contributions.47
More importantly, however,
impossible. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 7 n. 2 (citing Chesapeake Corp. v. Marc
P. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
39. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102 (2006).
40. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 7.
41. See Roe, supra note 1, at 26 (observing political origins of American corporate
structure, which have constrained ability of institutional ownership, resulting in dispersed
ownership and greater management discretion and control). See also Bernard S. Black,
Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 530-31, 542-53, 562-64,
567-68 (1990); Elhauge, supra note 6, at 816.
42. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 8.
43. See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L.
381, 382-83 (2002) (describing "flip-over," "flip-in" and "back-end" pills, all of which,
in the end, dilute the interests of an acquirer, rendering the takeover prohibitively
expensive).
44. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 8. Practitioners with whom I spoke expressed
ambivalence about golden parachutes because such parachutes could, under the right
circumstances, actually incentivize managers to sell the corporation and make a quick
profit. Broadly speaking, golden parachutes are perhaps best characterized as provisions
that allocate control to managers but do not necessarily reduce the likelihood of
beneficial takeovers.
45. Id. at 8-9.
46. Id. See also note 44, discussing an additional caveat regarding golden
parachutes.
47. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 10-11.
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Bebchuk et al. empirically reach the same conclusion. Their study
evaluated a group of "other provisions"; these "other provisions" did not
result in statistically significant relationships. 48 Such results support the
hypothesis that staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of
the bylaws, super-majority requirements for mergers and other
acquisition transactions, super-majority requirements for charter
amendments, poison pills and golden parachutes drive most of the
negative relationship with financial value, and, by implication, contribute
most significantly to the entrenchment of corporate managers.49
II.

Entrenched Managers Create Less Social Value

Undoubtedly, manager entrenchment has a variety of effects for
different executives and corporations. Entrenchment provides managers
discretion to pursue long-term profits in the face of short-term demands
from self-interested shareholders, 50 but also to pursue personal agendas
at the expense of shareholder profits,51 or, perhaps, sacrifice profits for
the good of the public.
As should be emphasized, which of these
outcomes usually accompanies entrenchment deserves empirical
treatment; theoretical and anecdotal evidence support each.53
As Part I discussed, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell have
observed, in the aggregate, a negative relationship between financial
value and six governance provisions most associated with entrenchment.
Although a statistical relationship does not necessarily mean
entrenchment produces lower financial value, these results do suggest

48. Id. at 17-22.
49. Id. at 33. Bebchuk et al. qualify that some of the relationship between
entrenchment provisions and financial value could merely reflect the decision to entrench
by managers of already poorly performing corporations. Such an issue of causality,
however, does not change the overarching claim that these provisions enable
entrenchment. Id.
50. Bebchuk & Stole, supra note 23; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 23; Stein,
supra note 23; Stout, supra note 23.
51. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1 (understanding present levels of executive
compensation as an agency problem); John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholder Versus Managers:
the Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1986) (noting preferences for
greater compensation, greater psychic income, and greater security revealed in empirebuilding); GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF
AMERICAN EXECUTIVES

(W.W. Norton & Company Ltd. 1991); Graef Crystal, New CEO

Pay-OutsourcingStudy is Out of Bounds, Sept. 1, 2004 (though disagreeing with study,
agreeing that CEO pay "borders on the obscene") (Bloomberg). Managers might also
entrench themselves simply because they have inherited a corporation performing poorly
independent of their own efforts.
52. Elhauge, supra note 6.
53. See notes 50-52. Empirical evidence has already discounted the possibility that
entrenched managers predominately use their discretion to pursue long-term profits. See,
e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.
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entrenched managers may use their discretion for ends independent of
corporate and shareholder wealth.
That entrenched managers sacrifice financial value does not,
however, indict entrenchment as a problem for social value. As noted
above, entrenched managers may be sacrificing corporate profits for their
own profits, for the sake of extra time on the golf course or for the sake
of the public. This last possibility, explored by Professor Elhauge in
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest,54 presents an
interesting, but overlooked,5 5 challenge to those calling for changes to
corporate governance laws in the form of increased accountability to
shareholders and takeover markets. Granted, entrenched managers
probably employ their discretion to the service of self-interest. Selfinterest, however, encompasses social and moral preferences, which, in
the end, could lead 56managers to make more socially valuable profitsacrificing decisions.
This possibility also reveals a conspicuous incompleteness in the
academic assessment of the underlying value to society of corporate
As Professor Elhauge observes, the
governance arrangements.
"canonical" obsession with profit-maximization
helps define the boundaries of the corporate law field. It leaves
corporate law scholars free to ignore issues about any effects the
corporation may have on the external world as topics best addressed
about
by other legal fields, and to focus on more tractable models
57
which corporate rules would maximize shareholder value.
This makes some sense. Corporations are, after all, the infamous, amoral
sociopaths, obedient only to the pursuit of profits.58 Only the managers
at the helm bring the social norms of a human being to the wheel.
Loosening the market shackles of these executives allows breathing
room for the sacrifice of profits when their social and moral norms
dictate.59
No doubt, on occasion, this occurs. But what happens more often?
Do executives use their discretion for the money trough or the public
alms? Economic theory and evidence focused on the association of
entrenchment with financial value do not speak to an association with
social value apart from equating financial wealth with social wealth.
Ironically, however, social psychological theory, which usually departs
54.

Elhauge, supra note 6.

55.

See id. at 736-37.

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 796-818.
Id. at 737.
See generally BAKAN, supra note 7.
Elhauge, supra note 6, at 740.
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from such analysis, also could support the assessment of entrenchment as
a problem. As discussed in the Introduction, and discussed in greater
detail in Part III, managers, like everyday people, respond to financial
and non-financial incentives. Which incentives come to the foreground,
and how these incentives unfold, depends in part on context. Because
entrenchment against financial accountability creates a context of
irresponsibility generally, I predicted entrenched managers also would be
less accountable to social concerns.
This Article undertakes an empirical assessment of the debate.
Building on the work of Bebchuk et al., the remainder of Part II
compares levels of entrenchment, as measured by the presence of their
six entrenching provisions, with the appearance of corporations on two
indexes used for socially responsible investing.
As the results
demonstrate, entrenchment was negatively associated with the
appearance of corporations on these indexes, buttressing the conclusion
that entrenchment not only harms financial value, but, more broadly,
social value.
A.

Sources of Data

Our social responsibility indexes are mouthfuls: the Dow Jones
SustAinability Index World (DJSIW) 60 and the Financial Times Stock
61
Exchange For Good U.S. Index Top 100 (FTSE4GoodUS00).
Governance data came from the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC). 62 Financial and ownership data came from ExecuComp and
Compustat.6 3
1.

Social Responsibility Data

DJSIW and FTSE4GoodUS1OO were used for several reasons.
First, each of these indexes aggregate data into coherent "scores" based
on a wide range of social responsibility criteria.64 Second, each generally
60. See Dow Jones SustAinability World Indexes Guide (September 2004) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter DJSWI Guide]. The most recent version can be found at
http://www.sustainability-index.com (last visited May 26, 2006).
61. See FTSE4Good Index Series Inclusion Criteria (November 2003) (on file with
the author) [hereinafter FTSE4Good Criteria]. The most recent version can be found at
http://www.ftse.com (last visited May 26, 2006).
FTSE4Good was created in
collaboration with UNICEF and the United Nations Children's Fund.
62. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 13. See also http://www.irrc.org (last visited
May 26, 2006).
63. Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 13; Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Dhananjay Nanda,
Access, Common Agency, and Board Size, at 4-5 (October 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
64. DJSWI Guide, supra note 60, at 9-13; FTSE4Good Criteria, supra note 61, at 4-
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takes best-of-class approaches, assessing corporations by industryspecific and general criteria.65 Third, Dow Jones and the Financial
Times, providers of these indexes, are established investment institutions
with considerable resources enabling thorough research and procedural
safeguards like independent auditing; 66 accordingly, their social
responsibility indexes lead the pack.6 7
Fourth, DJSIW and
FTS4GoodUS100 are based on research provided by peer-reviewed
members of the social responsibility research industry, Sustainable Asset
Management Research (SAM) and Ethical Investment Research Service
(EIRIS), respectively.6 8
DJSIW tracks the top ten percent, in terms of a "Corporate
Sustainability Assessment," of corporations followed by the Dow Jones
World Index. 69 Data comes from volunteer reporting questionnaires,
public company documents, external media, contact with stakeholders
and direct contact with the corporations. 70 Assessment criteria are
arranged in economic, environmental and social categories. 7' DJSIW
continually monitors corporations along such criteria 72 with
PricewaterhouseCoopers serving as the auditor of the data. 7'
FTSE4GoodUS 100 tracks the largest one hundred corporations that
have satisfied social responsibility "Inclusion Criteria., 74 The original
source of corporations comes from the FTSE All-World Developed USA
Index, which tracks the largest U.S. corporations.7 5 Data comes from

65. See DJSWI Guide, supra note 60, at 9-10; FTSE4Good Criteria, supra note 61,
at 3.
66. See generally http://www.dj.com
(last visited May
26, 2006);
http://www.ftse.com (last visited May 26, 2006).
67. See John Buckley & David Monsma, Non-financial Corporate Performance:
The MaterialEdges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J.ENVTL. L.

151, 190 (2004); Benjamin J. Richardson, Enlisting Institutional Investors in
Environmental Regulation: Some Comparativeand Theoretical Perspectives, 28 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 247, 289 (2002).
68. See generally http://www.sam-group.com (last visited May 26, 2006);
http://www.eiris.org (last visited May 26, 2006). See also Mistra, SustAinability and
onValues, Values for Money, Reviewing the Quality of SRI Research, (2004) (evaluating
SAM as the best all-around social responsibility investment research organization, with
EIRIS also rated favorably), available at: http://www.mistra.org (last visited May 26,
2006).
69. The Dow Jones World Index covers over 5000 of the largest publicly traded
corporations in the world. See http://www.djindexes.com (last visited May 26, 2006).
70. DJSWI Guide, supra note 60, at 9.
71. Id. at 9-13. DJSWI covers subjects such as codes of conduct, corporate
governance, customer relationships, environmental performance, efficiency and
reporting, and labor practices, human capital development and standards for suppliers.
72. Id. at 16-18.
73. Id. at 9.
74. FTSE4Good Criteria, supra note 61, at 4.
75. See http://www.ftse.com (last visited May 26, 2006).
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company questionnaires, direct company contact, company reports and
independent research.76 Corporations also must meet standards for a
given number of criteria in economic, environmental and social
categories." FTSE4GoodUS 100 also independently tracks human rights
records.7 8 FTSE4GoodUS100 regularly monitors its corporations but
does not appear to employ external auditors.79
Observations for DJSWI and FTSE4GoodUS 100 were made for the
years 2004, 2003, 2002 and 2001. Only U.S. corporations in the DJSWI
were studied, resulting in the inclusion of about sixty companies per
year; FTSE4GoodUS 100 included 100 U.S. companies. For each indexyear, dummy variables were assigned to corporations based on their
presence, or lack thereof, on the relevant index.
2.

Corporate Governance Data

Data regarding entrenchment was taken from the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). At the time of this study, the
IRRC had published data in six volumes: September, 1990; July, 1993;
July, 1995; February, 1998; November, 1999; and February, 2002.80
Each volume follows roughly 1400 to 1800 corporations, which always
have included the S&P 500.81 Each year accounts for over ninety percent
of U.S. market capitalization.82 The IRRC tracks a great deal of
corporate governance variables, including whether the corporations have
the entrenchment provisions studied by Bebchuk et al. Each corporation
was given an entrenchment score based, with equal weight, on the
number of entrenchment provisions the corporation contained.
3.

Control Data

Compustat, ExecuComp and IRRC provided control data. Control
83
variables included the size of the corporation (in terms of total assets),
the level of insider ownership, the level of institutional ownership and
the number of directors. Corporate size was expected to bear a strong
relationship to presence on the indexes because these indexes only
included large public corporations.
Both inside ownership and
institutional ownership could bear some relation to entrenchment because

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

FTSE4Good Criteria, supra note 61, at 4.
Id. at 4-9. FTSE4Good covers subjects comparable to DJSIW.
Id. at 7-9.
Id. at 4.
See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 13.
Id.
Id.

83.

See also id. at 17.
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levels of ownership reflect, to some extent, levels of control. The
number of directors in a corporation has been related to the number of84
stakeholder interests with which the corporation concerns itself.
Because each index tracks a range of social responsibility concerns, the
number of directors could also bear some relation to its appearance on
these indexes.
4.

Methodology

For each year of each social responsibility index, dummy variables
for inclusion on the index served as the dependent variables. These
variables were regressed against the entrenchment scores, as well as the
size of the corporation (in terms of total assets), the level of insider
ownership, the number of directors and the level of institutional
ownership. Because IRRC data was not available for every year studied,
data for the remaining years were "filled" ;85 the method of filling-either
using a previous year or later year of IRRC data-made no substantive
difference in the results.86 Corporations with dual classes of stock, as
well as Real Estate Investment Trusts, were removed from the study
because of their anomalous capitalization and corporate control
structures.8 7 Corporations with insider ownership greater than fifty
percent were also excluded because such inside executives were defacto
"entrenched" independent of any corporate governance arrangements.
B. Results
Bebchuk et al. provide thorough analysis of the incidence of
corporate governance provisions, their rates of increase or decline over
the years and general levels of entrenchment. 88 About half of the
corporations studied had entrenchment scores of three or more, with the
incidence of these levels slightly increasing over time, 89 suggesting that
entrenchment on account of these governance provisions represents a
significant concern. Below we focus on the relationship between the
entrenchment provisions and appearance on the two indexes of social
responsibility. Tables I and II report the results from each social
responsibility index.
Each table reports the coefficients of all
independent variables; statistical significance is reported in parentheses.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Aggarwal & Nanda, supra note 63.
Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 13.
See also id.
See id. at 13-14.

88.
89.

Id. at 14-16.
Id. at 15.
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_

_

_

_
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_

_

_

_

_

_

_

2004

2003

2002

2001

ENTRENCHMENT

-.00966
(.018)

-.00858
(.044)

-.0091
(.016)

-.01024
(.025)

TOTAL ASSETS

4.97E-07

4.15E-07

2.61e-07

3.55e-07

(.000)

(.000)

(.001)

(.001)

NUMBER OF DIRECTORS

.00406
(.005)

.00517
(.003)

.0046
(.004)

.00525
(.010)

INSIDE OWNERSHIP

-.00853
(.004)

-.00907
(.003)

-.00589
(.008)

-.001
(.006)

INSTIT. OWNERSHIP

-3.79E-09
(.734)

-3.93E-09
(.736)

-3.60E-07
(.738)

-4.33e-09
(.726)

ADJ. R 2

.0289

.0434

TABLE Ih FTSE4GOODUSIOO
12004

2003

2002

2001

ENTRENCHMENT

-.01666
(0.001)

-.01489
(0.003)

-.01451
(.003)

-.00808
(.131)

TOTAL ASSETS

8.2 1E-07
(.000)

8.48E-07
(.000)

8.43e-07
(.000)

7.67e-07
(.000)

NUMBER OF DIRECTORS

.01587
(.000)

.01921
(.000)

.01897
(.000)

.01513
(.000)

INSIDE OWNERSHIP

-.00072

-.00092

-.00071

(.048)

(.011)

(.011)

-.00107
(.011)

-6.57E-09
(.635)

-6.62E-09
(.630)

-6.46e-09
(.637)

-5.31e-09
(.714)

.1335

.1617

.1483

.0953

INSTIT. OWNERSHIP

ADJ. R

2

As the tables reflect, the results were rather consistent:
(i) Entrenchment. Every observation but one indicates a negative,
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statistically significant relationship between the level of entrenchment
and appearance on these social responsibility indexes.
Possible
interpretations of these results are discussed below in Part III.
(ii) Corporate Size.
Every observation indicates a positive,
statistically significant relationship between the size of the corporation,
in terms of assets, and inclusion in the indexes, owing most likely to the
fact that the indexes consisted of the largest corporations in the U.S.
(iii) Number of Directors. Every observation indicates a positive,
statistically significant relationship between the number of directors on
the board and inclusion in the indexes. To the extent these indexes cover
a range of social responsibility concerns, these results accord with other
empirical work that has related the number of directors to the number of
social interests with which a corporation engages. 90
(iv) Insider Ownership. Every observation indicates a negative,
statistically significant relationship between levels of insider ownership
and inclusion in the indexes. Because ownership, to some extent, reflects
control, insider ownership reflects, to some extent, entrenchment. In this
sense, under most interpretations, an observed negative relationship
between insider ownership and these indexes could comport with a
negative relationship between entrenchment provisions and these
indexes.
(v) Institutional Ownership. Insignificant, negative relationships
were observed between institutional ownership and inclusion in the
indexes. Greater institutional ownership could be expected to reduce
levels of entrenchment. 91 Levels of institutional ownership, however,
could have a range of effects on social responsibility inclusion,
depending on the interests of the institutions, the relationship of social
responsibility to financial value and the effects such institutional
ownership has on management incentives and perceptions.
The concern exists that the consistency of these results merely
reflected consistency among the indexes and among the years of each
index. Table III displays the percentage of corporations in the DJSIW
that were also in the FTSE4GoodUS 100 each year; Table IV displays the
number of changes made to each index year over year.

90.
91.

Aggarwal & Nanda, supra note 63.
But see Roe, supra note 1.
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TABLE III. NUMBER OF DJSIW COMPANIES
FTSE4GooDUSIO0
2004
2003
2002

22/64
34%

20/64
31%

16/57
28%

[Vol. I111: 1
IN

2001
18/68
26%

TABLE IV: NUMBER OF CHANGES YEAR-O VER- YEAR

DJSIW

FTSE4GooDUSI00

2004-2003

2003-2002

2002-2001

17

30

44

27%

53%

65%

41
41%

0
0%

38
38%

As Tables C and D reflect, there were a great number of differences
between the indexes themselves and within the indexes year to year.
There was only one exception to the variation: FTSE4GoodUS 100 made
no changes in its index from 2002 to 2003. Thus, for the most part,
consistency among the indexes and the years of each index does not
explain the consistency of the regression results.92 Indeed, the significant
variation among the indexes and the years supports the robustness of the
data. As evidenced below, however, normative interpretation of these
results proves difficult.
Ill.

Theoretical Explanations for the Results

What follows offers a sample of interpretative frameworks. This
does not constitute an exclusive list, nor a complete analysis from the
frameworks herein. Rather, Part III provides an introduction to some of
the issues raised by the results and the relationship between
entrenchment, which, to some extent, boils down to insulation from
accountability to profits, and inclusion in indexes of social responsibility.
Each framework offers a glimpse into what the empirical data could
reveal about entrenching corporate governance provisions. Although we
92.

Such differences could reflect a number of things.

Differences between the

indexes could reflect: differences in methodology; differences in assessments of what
constitutes socially responsible behavior; or the fact that U.S. corporations in the DJSIW
are pooled against corporations

internationally, whereas U.S. corporations in the

FTSE4GoodI00 only compete among themselves. Differences year to year within each
index ideally reflect accurate monitoring of the corporations involved, with changes made
accordingly.
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are far from definitive normative conclusions, the essence of the analysis
supports the argument that entrenching governance arrangements should
be carefully scrutinized.
A.

Doing Well By Doing Good

Without the protection of entrenchment, managers find themselves
more accountable to shareholders and the market for takeovers. Because
shareholders are most concerned with profits,93 and takeovers discipline
underperforming profitability, 94 these executives must be profitable to
keep their jobs and increase their pay. The appearance of corporations
run by these managers on social responsibility indexes reflects the
distinct possibility that socially responsible behavior increases profits.
Indeed, Dow Jones launched its responsibility indexes on the premise
that "corporate sustainability create[s] long-term shareholder value by
embracing opportunities and managing risks deriving from economic,
environmental and social developments." 95 Dow Jones understands
"sustainability as a catalyst for enlightened and disciplined management,
96
and, thus, a crucial success factor.,
Perhaps we should be relieved to find that rigorous profitmaximization means rigorous social responsibility.
Sound labor
practices make more productive workers; "green" energy can be costeffective. Undoubtedly this occurs. Ford Motor Company, for example,
renovated its River Rouge manufacturing plant with a roof of living
sedum plants, drainage swales, permeable pavement, skylights and
97
restored natural habitats not solely for the sake of the environment.
Rather, the sedum roof should out-last traditional tar-and-metal and
provide better insulation, saving costs; the roof, swales and permeable
pavement filter run-off and reduce liability for river pollution; and
employees are healthier, happier and more productive.98
For the moment, assume these results represent the best-of-allpossible worlds. Profitable managers are also socially responsible
because such responsibility maximizes profits. Because our indexes
provide a rough, but accurate, indication of such responsibility, and
93. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 718 (assuming shareholders prefer
profit-maximization).
94. Id. at 701.
95. DJSWI Guide, supra note 60, at 8.
96. Id.
97. See
http://www. ford.com/en/goodWorks/environment/cleanerManufacturing/
rougeRenovation.htm (last visited May 26, 2006).
98. See MICHAEL BRAUNGART & WILLIAM MCDONOUGH, CRADLE TO CRADLE:
REMAKING THE WAY WE MAKE THINGS 160-64 (North Point Press 2002). See also
Andrew Wagner, Corporate Consciousness, DWELL MAGAZINE 170-72 (Oct. & Nov.

2004).
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because such responsibility maximizes profits, appearance on these
indexes does not indicate over-responses to social interests but an
alignment of such interests with corporate wealth. Several concerns
require elaboration with this in mind.
First, the explanation that managers "do well by doing good" does
not, in itself, provide a normative claim against entrenchment because
the explanation makes no claims as to causality. 99 Ex post we can
describe the state of the world; ex ante we have not predicted how
entrenchment has affected that state. In other words, accountable, as
opposed to entrenched, managers could be socially responsible because
the incentives of accountability to profits push them in that direction. On
the other hand, profitable and socially responsible managers could be
accountable because their performance has never necessitated the
protection of entrenchment. In one form or another, this problem
plagues any interpretation of the results. We do have reasons, however,
to discount the issue. Entrenchment resulting from more permanent
constitutional provisions, such as staggered boards and super-majority
voting requirements, arguably supports a causal explanation because
underperforming managers would find after-the-fact institution of these
arrangements difficult. 00
Second, assuming causality was not a significant problem,
explaining the negative relationship between entrenchment and social
responsibility in this manner requires the further assumption that the
incentives to financially perform lead managers to perform in a socially
responsible way. Some would have no qualms with this assumption
because they see opportunities to make socially responsible profits as
"twenty dollar bills lying on the sidewalk"; managers already have
"ample incentives to recognize and act on such profit-maximizing
Such a perspective, however, may underestimate
opportunities."'01
Managers face
important characteristics of the business world.
incredible complexity in the production of their goods and services.
Accordingly, the production of comparable goods and services could,
and probably does, occur through different but comparably profitable
Concluding which of these paths maximizes social
paths. 0 2
03
responsibility, in addition to the uncertain task of maximizing profits,
99. See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 5, at 33.
100. Id. at 33-34. This does not, however, hold true with regard to poison pills and
golden parachutes.
101. Elhauge, supra note 6, at 744-45.
102. See generally SUZANNE BERGER, How WE COMPETE (Double House 2006)
(concluding paths to financial success are extremely diverse and complex after following
over 500 case studies of international corporations).
103. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The LegitimatingSchemas
of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1, 91-99 (2004) (describing
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requires surmounting significant practical and cognitive hurdles,
especially when the paths of social responsibility involve departure
from
04
1
possibility.
of
categories
preconceived
and
custom
of
the paths
For this reason, the assumption that managers would readily find
those twenty dollar bills appears somewhat unrealistic. At the very least,
we might conclude some corporations find the bills faster; our indexes
might track those in the vanguard. Because no affirmative justification
exists for assuming a union between the incentives to make profits and
the incentives to act responsibly, we are left, at this point, with
indeterminacy.
Third, and last, this explanation also does not account for the at least
ostensible reasons executives would give for pursuing social
responsibility with their corporations. Ben Cohen, chief executive of
Ben & Jerry's, asserts, "It makes no sense to compartmentalize our
lives-to be cutthroat in business, and then volunteer some time or
donate some money to charity."' 0 5 Although Ben & Jerry's was
originally a maverick in this regard, integration of social responsibility
principles into corporate decision-making has become a blueprint of
sustainability reports for public companies. 10 6 Perhaps these corporate
leaders are liars or delusional. At the same time, recall that managers are
people and, unlike the corporations they run, are subject to very human
concerns, such as social and moral norms.
This leaves us with the somewhat paradoxical possibility that
managers accountable to shareholders and takeover markets could be
accountable to social responsibility for reasons other than accountability
to profits and yet nevertheless related to a lack of entrenchment. In
reality, we can relax this tension with the observation that our investment
indexes could be concerned with particularly conspicuous examples of
socially responsible, profitable practices. 107 The tension further relaxes if
we assume shareholders are sometimes concerned with social interests
apart from profits, an increasingly realistic claim. 1 8 Managers
clarity of profit-maximization as an illusion).
104. Id. at 99; Jon Hanson & Ronald Chen, CategoricallyBiased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S.CAL. L. REv. 1103, 1160-64,
1180, 1186 (2004).
105. Chen & Jon Hanson, supra note 103, at 94.
106. Id. at 93-94.
107. DJSIW not only espouses its relationship to success; the index outperformed its
cousin, the Dow Jones Global Index, by 140% over an 8-year period. See Michele
Sutton, Between a Rock and a Judicial Hard Place: Corporate Social Responsibility
Reporting and PotentialLegal Liability under Kasky v. Nike, 72 UMKC L. REv. 1159,
1163 (2004).
108. See Social Investment Forum, 2003 Report on Socially Responsible Investing
Trends in the United States (Dec. 2003) (socially responsible investing accounted for
11.3 percent of total investment assets managed by professionals in U.S.). Also available
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accountable to such shareholders would particularly do well by doing
good. In the end, however, the ambiguous nature of profit-maximization,
which renders far from inevitable the aligning of corporate behavior with
profitable, socially responsible practices, indicates more than this
framework could be at work. 109
B. Doing Well By Looking Good
A more skeptical take would suggest managers, pressed for profits,
recognize the publicity value in performing well in indexes of social
responsibility. Just as executives may "game" earnings for the sake of
stock prices, executives concerned with the bottom-line also could be
"gaming" social responsibility performance. 110 Whether the indexes
themselves have been captured by the corporations"' or simply lack the
resources to police them, such gaming goes unpunished. Undoubtedly
this occurs as well. McDonalds may introduce salads to its menu, but the
fries keep them in business. That social disclosure largely occurs on a
12
voluntary basis in an unregulated context aggravates the problem.
Of course, there will always be opportunists ready to game the
system, even in a legally regulated world. Increased attention to the
subject, as well as self-regulation," 3 has probably helped. Mandatory
disclosure laws could further the cause. 1 4 Some corporations in the
indexes studied here probably do not belong there. But there are two
reasons to discount the prevalence of gaming. First, enough independent
eyes watch the largest corporations to ensure some degree of honesty in
their communications to the public." 15 Second, these eyes presently have
the support of at least some U.S. laws, particularly laws prohibiting fraud
and, perhaps, even negligent disclosure." 6 Although an inherent
problem, "gaming," or more euphemistically, "elevat[ing] form over

at http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/research/trends/sri-trends-report 2003.pdf.
109. Indeed, Dow Jones launched its sustainability indexes for the very reason that
socially responsible profit-making does not come naturally and requires sustained
research. See DJSIW Guide, supra note 60, at 5, 8.
110. See, e.g., The Good Company, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2005.

111.

See

STIGLER,

supra note 9, at 119-20.

See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
CorporateSocial Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1299-1306 (1999) (proposing
112.

possible models for regulated social responsibility disclosure).
113. Angela J. Campbell, Self-regulation and the Media, 51

FED. COMM. L.J. 711,
715-17 (1999) (generally discussing the possibility and advantages of self-regulation).
114. See Sutton, supra note 107, at 1181-1183; Williams, supra note 112.
115. Sutton, supra note 107; see James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the
Limits of FirstAmendment Formalism:Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1091 (2004).
116. Sutton, supra note 107, at 1176-77, 1183.
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substance," '" 17 does not wholly undermine the legitimacy of social
responsibility disclosure.
C. Doing Well by Being Good
That corporations with accountable executives find themselves in
social responsibility indexes could reflect the fact that these corporations
simply have good, responsible managers. Such managers could selfselect themselves into situations of accountability (either through seeking
corporations that already have such accountability in place or through
creating such accountability on arrival) or are themselves selected
because of their responsible dispositions. This explanation adequately
describes the statistical observations, but suggests the social performance
of corporations and their managers depends on the social preferences and
dispositions of these executives, which are given. This perspective
leaves no debate over the value of corporate governance arrangements
because the arrangements merely reflect, rather than create, the
underlying reality. "Good" managers lead "good" corporations, such
that we can only hope our mothers, kindergartens, colleges and business
schools produce and send them to the boardroom. Although an
inherently difficult explanation to prove, as well as to refute, such a
dispositional perspective runs counter to the more contextual, socialpsychological interpretation that follows.
D. Doing as We're Told
Here we elaborate the underlying theory that led to the empirical
hypothesis of the Article. Such a social-psychological interpretation
could muster a rather different explanation for the results. Every
executive, at least to some extent, experiences the same concerns as
every other person: self-preservation and greater compensation, social
status and power, conformity and obedience, moral obligations and
compassion. Self-interest abides in each of these light and dark corners
of the heart, leaving us to ponder which interests surface, when and how.
As psychological research demonstrates, context plays an important role
in bringing out the best and worst of us. Contrary to a "fundamental
attribution error," which disproportionately understands behavior as the
product of stable dispositions, 1 8 human behavior reflects a nuanced
interaction between complex personalities and the contextual situations
in which they find themselves. Importantly, such could be the case for
117. Id. at 1183. The euphemism also implies a less malicious explanation: simple
following-the-leader leads to a perfunctory interest in social responsibility indexes.
118. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 11, at 136-37.
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managers in the context of certain corporate governance arrangements.
Herbert Blumer summarized the logic of this approach in his
principles of symbolic interaction:
Humans act toward a thing on the basis of the meaning they assign to
the thing .... Meanings are socially derived, which is to say that
meaning is not inherent in a state of nature.... There is no absolute
meaning. Meaning is negotiated through interaction with others....
The perception and interpretation of social symbols are modified by
the individual's own thought processes.119
Such logic follows inexorably from a very human dilemma. Humans
enter the world with a "bundle of passions."' 120 Beyond the most basic
interactions with the world, such as the search for food, these passions
"cannot assess and direct [their] own behavior"' 121 because meaning does
not inhere in the state of nature. Social interaction provides the meaning
and rules for the game. Accordingly, we must exist in a constant state of
interaction with social contexts, which influence how, and when, our
"passions" unfold. Indeed, even an anti-authoritarian needs the rules of
authority.
Long before Blumer, Shakespeare understood this dilemma more
colorfully. As MacBeth laments,
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
22
Signifying nothing.1
Not surprisingly, dramaturgical images abound in the literature of
symbolic interaction and social psychology generally. 123 Cognitive
theory describes context in terms of "schemas," such as "scripts," which
construct, among other things, heuristic "roles" that provide meaning to
the world. These schemas are knowledge structures that "influence all
aspects of information processing," can be "useful under some

119.

HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD 2-3

(Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1969).
120.

JODI O'BRIEN & PETER KOLLOCK, THE PRODUCTION OF REALITY 34 (Pine Forge

Press 2d ed. 1997) (1994).

121.
122.
123.

Id.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE

(Doubleday Anchor Books 1959) (introducing the concept of social interaction as a
dramaturgical performance).

2006]

ENTRENCHED MANAGERS

circumstances," but also a "liability[y] under others.' 24 Research has
repeatedly confirmed Blumer's fundamentals concerning human
nature.t 25 Social meaning, through interpretation of the world, mediates
the interaction of the "passions" with context and accordingly provides
rules for behavior.
Laws, of course, act as explicit contexts and schemas. Corporate
governance laws and rules are no different. These laws, often viewed in
terms of sanctions and incentives, also provide a meaningful backdrop
through which we understand the appropriate norms of behavior for roles
within the corporate entity. Fiduciary duties, as a relevant example, apart
from creating a framework of legal incentives also generate substance
and meaning for interpretations of how boards of directors should
behave. It seems likely that, regardless of the actual threat of sanctions,
directors are influenced, to some extent, by their awareness of their roles
as fiduciaries. In a similar vein, directors derive their "legitimacy" from
the "shareholder franchise."'' 26 Such rhetoric further reflects a prominent
cultural script in which directors, 27
and by implication, managers, serve in
others.
for
fiduciaries
of
the roles
It should come as no great surprise that governance provisions that
undermine legitimacy undermine more than accountability to
shareholders. Entrenched managers have broken from their legitimate
social roles. We should not expect such managers, under such corrupted
circumstances, to feel any great pressure to account to anyone but
themselves. Indeed, entrenched managers not only experience less
accountability to shareholders and takeover markets but also less
reputational accountability to labor markets. 128 It is not necessarily the
case that such managers are any more rotten than the rest of the bunch.
Rather, entrenched managers find themselves in an insulated role that
suggests as appropriate, or at least not unconscionable, the diversion of
corporate resources for their more selfish ends.
Academics themselves contribute to the same context. Scholars
have held forth as appropriate compensation such illicit activities as

124. Chen & Hanson, supra note 103, at 1128.
125. See generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 103 (reviewing research on the
influence of context); Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 11 (reviewing research on the
influence of context). See also Philip Zimbardo & Ken Musen, Quiet Rage: The Stanford
Prison Study (Insight Video 1991) (following experiment in which students and a
psychology professor, aware of their role-playing, nevertheless adopted their roles as
prisoners, guards and the warden to such an extent that the experiment was cancelled
only after the intervention of an outside observer).
126. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
127. See id.
128. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers'Discretionand Investors' Welfare: Theory
and Evidence, 9 DEL. J.CoRP. L. 540, 543-44 (1984).
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insider trading and misappropriating corporate opportunities. 129 While
debate over the effects of such activities on corporate wealth
continues, 130 consideration of the broader social implications such
context has on the role of managers gets swept under the rug.' 3 1 Insider
trading and misappropriation simply sound "unfair" to your average
person, particularly when corporate law prohibits the practices.
Regardless of the internal efficiency of such "compensation," the
practices place managers in a less transparently accountable role vis-Avis society. 132 It is no wonder entrenched managers might feel less
remorse in their focus
on personal, as opposed to public, gain. They
133
have been told to.

This interpretation has two important advantages. First, it requires
no assumptions about the equation of profits with social responsibility;
indeed, we could even believe inclusion in social responsibility indexes
involves misguided, but well-intentioned, distraction from profitmaximization. In this descriptive form, the interpretation does not
necessarily implicate a normative claim about the financial or social
value of entrenchment.
Second, this interpretation permits a more realistic understanding of
accountability to profits. Managers have discretion regardless of specific
governance provisions because profit-maximization proves a concept as
amorphous as social responsibility performance. 134 Profits, as discussed
129. Walker, supra note 3, at 598-600 (reviewing the literature).
130. See generally id. (reviewing arguments and concluding many non-traditional
forms of compensation not only are inefficient but also additive in their ability to increase
total managerial wealth).
131. See Margolis et al., supra note 10.
132. Such lack of transparency has efficiency implications for corporate welfare as
well. See generally Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1 (arguing managers use less
transparent forms of compensation to hide egregious rent extraction).
133. See Manda Sails, Why We Don't Study Corporate Responsibility, HARVARD
BUSINESS SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (May 17, 2004) (interviewing Professor Margolis).
Professor Margolis observes:
Sustaining research attention on both the ethical and economic responsibilities
of business, and on the tensions between them, shapes the orientation we
inculcate to business school students about their role and responsibilities. They
are not merely agents of shareholders. They are leaders and trustees of perhaps
the most significant institutions in the contemporary era. How managers see
themselves and understand their role is an important contributing factor to their
ethical conduct. Scholarly attention to ethics and values does indeed have an
impact on business leaders' self-conception and resulting behavior.
Id.
134. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 103, at 91-99. Further, not all of our
entrenching provisions necessarily lead to fewer beneficial control transactions. As
discussed at note 44, golden parachutes may incentivize managers to sell their
corporations. This leaves open the question why such provisions necessarily reduce firm
value.
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above, come in many forms; profit-maximization, therefore, becomes
more of an art than a science, with profit-maximization under social
standards a supreme act of artistry. Often, general corporate laws ensure
such discretion persists across the board. For example, both Delaware
and the Revised Model Business Code provide only the directors can
initiate and place on the shareholder ballot charter amendments and
merger proposals.135 This serious restriction to shareholder power
applies regardless of whether the corporation has any "entrenchment"
provisions. Thus, even managers "accountable" to shareholders, and
therefore "accountable" to profit-making, probably can pursue social
agendas within these confines if they perceive their roles in this
manner. 36
A key element, then, could be the perception of
accountability, and not just accountability itself.
As with other interpretations, introducing greater complexity raises
questions. Managers operate in a much larger context than the presence
of a few corporate governance provisions. How, for example, do the
corporations of entrenched managers handle shareholder proposals?
What kind of internal audits do they conduct? Where are their
headquarters? What business schools did entrenched managers attend, if
they attended any at all? To what social clubs do these managers
belong? And so on. We might infer from our results the possibility that
these six entrenching governance provisions are conspicuous indications
of a much broader, as yet unexamined, situation that affects managerial
accountability to shareholders and, perhaps, society as a whole. Much of
this, however, remains conjecture, and takes its place alongside other
interpretations as a plausible piece of the picture.
Conclusion
Managers accountable to shareholders, takeover markets and, in the
end, profits, are also accountable to two prominent investment indexes
based on social responsibility performance. Interpretations of such
results range from hurrah to humbug. Perhaps socially responsible
practices are also profitable.
Perhaps managers accountable to
shareholders also feel accountable to others generally. Or perhaps these
managers just appearsocially responsible, having deceptively gamed the
system. From the original, more social-psychological hypothesis, each
of these interpretations likely reflects part of the picture, but the message
should be an overlooked aspect of corporate governance: the extent to
which governance arrangements might affect the social role of the
135.

See Bebchuk, supra note 15, at 844-45 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §242(b);

MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.03).

136.

See also Elhauge, supra note 6,at 776-83.
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manager playing his part. Given the amorphous nature of maximizing
profits, managers face a range of profitable paths, and only some will
pursue the more socially responsible possibilities. This Article suggests
governance arrangements that help construct accountable roles provide
some of the impetus toward, at the least, an awareness of accountability
to social interests beyond shareholder wealth. This may be the case
because managers unaccountable to shareholders have been divorced
from their legitimate social roles as fiduciaries and representatives within
the corporate democracy. 137 Perhaps such executives, perched atop the
business world, begin to understand themselves as no longer accountable
to anyone.
Regardless, the results underscore the problematic nature of
thoroughly decoupling ownership from control with governance
provisions like staggered boards and limits to amend the corporate
charter. This understanding, however, leaves open the more practical
question of reform. Some might suggest leaving things alone regardless
of empirical evidence. 138 Corporations are systems of contracts, an
important contractual relationship being the one between managers and
shareholders. Such relationships reflect the bargains of an open market,
and while not perfect, tinkering with these relationships could cause
more harm than good. Others might simply call for a wholesale
prohibition
of entrenching
arrangements,
which
undermine
accountability and may not be the product of legitimate dickering but
rather the result of managerial manipulation and power.' 39 More
nuanced reform might involve ensuring shareholders have real power, at
the very least, to force changes in the underlying rules of the corporate
charter. 140 A rather different approach could include greater judicial
recognition of the problems associated with the governance provisions
herein. For example, perhaps courts should be especially careful in
applying doctrines like the business judgment rule in suits involving
corporations with a plethora of entrenchment provisions that have
de
4
facto insulated their managers from accountability to the market) '
137.
138.

See Bebchuk, supra note 15, at 837.
See id. at 875 (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, ch. 1 (Harvard University Press 1991)).
139.
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 11 (Harvard University Press 2004)

("[A]rrangements that insulate directors from removal by either a proxy fight or a
takeover should be eliminated or reduced.").
140. See Bebchuk, supra note 15, at 870-75.
141. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over
Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware CorporationLaw, 56 BUS.
LAW. 1287, 1293 (2001). Allen et al. argue for an intermediate standard of review when
an "entrenchment motive" is involved. This speaks primarily to decisions to defend

against takeovers with mechanisms like a poison pill. Here I consider an extension of
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However, any conclusions drawn from these results, as well as
results from prior studies on the financial performance of entrenched
managers, need to be tempered with several caveats in mind. To begin,
these results stem from the study of generally large, public corporations.
Many reforms might apply to corporations in general, large or small,
private or public. But private corporations, as well as smaller, public
corporations, exist in an environment quite different from that of the
public behemoths tracked by Dow Jones and FTSE.142 At the same time,
the largest of the behemoths exist in a unique environment as well:
corporations like General Electric simply do not face many takeover
threats because of their size. Extending the conclusions of research like
mine to such corporations may not be appropriate without further
inquiry.
Another caveat involves a lack of more in-depth case studies.
Empirical evidence generally linking entrenchment with poor financial
and social performance does not give us a complete picture of the actual
impact entrenchment has on society. Although entrenchment may
usually lead managers astray, entrenchment may also enable fundamental
innovation in some cases. Such innovation may not have occurred if the
innovators were tethered to prevailing norms of profit-making and social
responsibility. Ben & Jerry's, to take an earlier example, was in the
vanguard of corporate social responsibility. Historically, however, the
company has been controlled by insiders through a dual class
capitalization structure.143 Ben & Jerry's serves as a particularly
interesting example for two reasons. First, we ought to explore the tradeoff between the contributions of insulated innovators and the more
widespread decadence of our average entrenched manager. Second, with
Ben & Jerry's in mind, we might learn that certain governance
arrangements, such as dual classes of stock, are more often associated
with "good" entrenchment, whereas other kinds of arrangements, such as
staggered boards or poison pills, are associated with "bad" entrenchment.
A final caveat, and perhaps the elephant in the room, regards the
such intermediate review: judges should be wary of director behavior any time
entrenchment provisions de facto insulate management from shareholder accountability
and takeover markets. The practical effects of such an extension, however, would be
limited because most derivative and direct suits likely involve the circumstances
considered by the authors.
142. For example, provisions like supermajority voting requirements balance the
competing interests and views of active shareholder groups, such as founders and venture
capitalists, within smaller corporations. As another example, golden parachutes
incentivize otherwise wary managers to take on risky ventures for the very purpose of
seeking control transactions.
143. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (1994)
available at http://www.benjerry.com/our-Company/research-library/fin/annuals.html
(last visited May 26, 2006).
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unproven relationship between profits or social responsibility
performance and the slippery idea of societal welfare. Even assuming
"maximizing" "welfare" has real normative meaning, 144 and even
assuming we could gather accurate measurements of things like earnings,
environmental pollution and human rights abuses, we would face the
overwhelming task of weighing these interests together in an acceptable
manner. Just as profits alone will not adequately reflect the costs and
benefits of a business endeavor, neither will social responsibility
performance. In short, the costs of doing business come with benefits,
and neither profits nor social responsibility indexes can tell anyone
exactly how the scales turn out. While this Article avoids the broader
philosophical and pragmatic debates in this area, 45any empirical study
should be understood with these questions in mind. 1
These caveats, as well as the competing interpretations I offered
earlier, by no means render policy suggestions about entrenching
governance arrangements futile. As with all research, we are involved in
a work in progress, but must make do with what we have. Thus far a
strong case has been made that certain entrenchment provisions could
lead to lower financial value. From this, among other things, some
scholars have argued for reconsideration of the existing balance of power
in U.S. public corporations. This Article has taken a different approach,
linking certain entrenchment provisions with poor social performance,
but has taken a small step toward reaching the same conclusion.

144. See generally Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
(Harvard University Press 2002) (advocating a "welfare economics" perspective); Joseph
W. Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2002)
(critiquing this perspective and advocating "fairness" concerns).

145. The seriousness and complexity of this problem, under a welfare economics
perspective, range tremendously. This range depends on a matrix of three general
directions: product and service functions, profitability and impacts on factors apart from
profits, such as environmental pollution. With similarities in two directions, comparison
along the third becomes more universally meaningful. But as similarities diverge among
all the directions, comparison becomes exceedingly difficult.

